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This paper pursues a theme developed by Professor Lome Sossin in an address 
delivered for U.N.B.’s Ivan Rand Memorial Lecture Series “Judicial Appointment, 
Democratic Aspirations and the Culture of Accountability”.1 Sossin argues that a fair 
and transparent appointment process for federally-appointed judges, insulated from 
political manipulation, should be thought of as one of several essential conditions to 
promote judicial independence and impartiality. The purpose of this paper is to look 
more closely into what the mechanics of such a process might be like. A judicial 
selection process in a democratic state needs to correspond to and promote 
democracy, and so I will begin by clarifying what I mean by democracy. Next, I will 
argue that in most respects, the Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee in 
Ontario, which has been in operation for two decades, serves as a model for the 
improvement of the judicial selection process for federally-appointed judges. Finally, 
I will argue that the selection process should be ideologically-neutral so that a “left-” 
or “right-wing” preference is treated more like an irrelevant personal characteristic 
than a determining factor in appointment.
D e m o c r a c y
I have argued elsewhere that democracy is founded on the principle of mutual 
respect.2 Five sub-principles of democracy are derived from mutual respect: social 
equality, deference to the majority where consensus cannot be reached, protection for 
minority rights, respect for individual freedom, and integrity. These principles, in 
turn, create two basic duties for public-sector officials including judges: impartiality, 
and a duty to act in the public interest.
Mutual respect means that we owe the same consideration to others, while 
making decisions that have an impact on them, as we feel that we are owed when 
they make decisions that affect us.3 Ronald Dworkin put it this way: “...individuals 
have a right to equal concern and respect in the design and administration of the
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political institutions that govern them.. . .  [TJhey possess [this right] not by virtue of 
birth or characteristic or merit or excellence but simply as human beings with the 
capacity to make plans and give justice.”4
The first sub-principle of democracy derived from mutual respect is social 
equality. Reasonable people can and will disagree about the breadth of social 
equality in a democratic context, and the best ways of implementing the principle, 
but no one would disagree that social equality is an important democratic ideal. The 
Supreme Court can be thought of as a battleground where proponents of liberal and 
conservative versions of social equality fight for ascendancy with regard to particular 
issues such as how best to respect the equality of gays and lesbians, or how best to 
recognize the equality of children with autism in providing appropriate treatment.
Second, mutual respect suggests that everyone in a particular community 
should have an equal opportunity to participate in community decision-making. As 
much as possible, political decisions should be made by consensus. Where consensus 
is not possible, the majority rules out of practical necessity, but with respect for the 
situation of minorities. That leads to the third sub-principle, protection for minority 
rights. Even when minorities are on the losing side of an issue, they still have the 
right to be treated with equal concern and respect. Human rights legislation is not a 
catalogue of special entitlements, but rather an attempt to list the most important 
ways in which all members of society, and in particular minorities and the less 
advantaged, deserve to be treated with equal concern and respect.
Respect for individual freedom is the fourth sub-principle: mutual respect 
implies that individuals in society should have the right to make their own decisions 
about how to conduct their lives, compatible with an equal freedom for others. 
Integrity, the fifth sub-principle, is honesty combined with concern and respect for 
our fellow human beings. “One cannot have integrity without being honest... but one 
can certainly be honest and yet have little integrity.”5 Finally, mutual respect implies 
that public officials have a general duty to treat all citizens fairly and impartially, and 
they are obligated to try to act in the general public interest and to resist attempts by 
some to exercise undue influence over the public policy or administrative process.6
The practice of democracy is constantly changing. Representative democracy 
with a universal franchise is a relatively recent invention in human history that 
developed alongside the increasing recognition of the importance of mutual respect 
as a basic principle of liberal political ideology. Throughout history, there has always 
been a lag between ideals and practice, and this delay helps to explain, for example, 
why the current system for appointment of s. 96 and s. 101 judges does not meet 
current democratic expectations.
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J u d ic ia l  Se l e c t io n
Professor Sossin noted in his Rand Lecture that the system developed in Ontario to 
select provincially-appointed judges, in no small measure thanks to the efforts of our 
respected colleague Peter Russell, is reputed to be one of the best in the country.7 I 
agree. This system has been in effect, with several modifications, since the late 
1980s. It is worth examining this process in more detail.
There are currently thirteen members of the Ontario Judicial Appointments 
Advisory Committee (JAAC). Lay members (persons without a law degree) 
comprise more than half: seven of the thirteen members. Ontario is the only 
jurisdiction in Canada where lay members constitute the majority on a judicial 
selection advisory committee. This provision has worked well; the lay members have 
brought an invaluable perspective to the deliberations of the Committee, and the 
presence of a majority of lay members underlines the fact that the courts are a public 
service, and not a private club where members of the legal profession practice their 
craft. The Ontario committee also includes three judges appointed by the Chief 
Justice, and three lawyers appointed by lawyers’ professional associations (the 
Ontario Branch of the Canadian Bar Association, the Law Society, and the County 
and District Law Presidents’ Association, respectively). Committee members are 
appointed for terms of one to three years, and their names and biographies are made 
public.
When there are judicial vacancies, the Committee advertises for qualified 
lawyers with at least ten years of experience to apply. The advertisements specify 
that “applicants must have a sound knowledge of the law, an understanding of the 
social issues of the day and an appreciation for the cultural diversity of Ontario. ... 
Applications are encouraged from women, aboriginal peoples, francophones, persons 
with disabilities, and visible and ethnocultural minorities.” The committee’s mandate 
requires it to recommend judicial appointments that “reflect the diversity of 
Ontario’s population, including gender, geography, racial and cultural minorities.”8 
After interviewing the leading applicants, the committee provides at least two names 
to the Attorney General. The Attorney General makes the final selection, although 
additional names may be requested if the Attorney General does not like any of the 
names submitted.
The committee’s web site mentions the following qualities that it looks for in 
applicants: professional excellence, experience in professional activities related both 
to important legal issues and the administration of justice, good writing skills, 
commitment to public service, awareness of social problems and values that are 
relevant to litigation, good listening skills, respect for human dignity, politeness,
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high ethical standards, patience, fairness, punctuality, good work habits, compassion, 
and humility.
The committee seeks to recommend applicants whom they believe can resist 
“judgitis” (allowing the esteem of the judicial office produce a swelled ego), and 
who can act impartially.9 My understanding is that the liberal or conservative 
disposition of the applicants is not an issue unless the committee considers that this 
disposition may well lead to judicial decision-making that is not up to the standards 
of impartiality expected of judges.10
The result of this process is that the Ontario provincial judiciary is now 
amongst the most diverse in the country in terms of gender and minority group 
inclusion.11 For example, at the end of 2004, when 75 per cent (224) of Ontario’s 
272 judges had been appointed through the Advisory Committee process, 34 per cent 
of the 224 appointments were women, seven per cent were francophone, two per cent 
had a First Nations background, and seven per cent were visible minorities.12 
Interviews that I have conducted since the early 1990s with trial lawyers and superior 
court judges in Ontario indicate that there is a general consensus amongst these 
groups that the Ontario appointments system has led to higher quality appointments 
than before.
The appointments of the lay members of the Committee, who come from each 
of the seven judicial districts of the province, are approved by all the party leaders in 
the legislature, and this process encourages the selection of lay committee members 
who are competent, have integrity, and who will act in a non-partisan fashion.
The first Ontario Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee was established 
as a pilot project by Liberal Attorney General Ian Scott in late 1988, and the first 
appointments pursuant to the new system were made in 1989. After several years of 
operation, the Committee wrote a report evaluating its experience and recommending 
that legislation be enacted to give the Committee permanence.13 The Report 
contained a recommendation that the lay members of the committee be selected 
through a process that involved consultation with the leaders of each of the parties in 
the legislature in order to make the lay member selection process multi-partisan.
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Courts Resources, Expenditures and Personnel, 2000/01 (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Justice 
Statistics, Statistics Canada, 2002).
12 Supra note 9.
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None of the parties were enthusiastic about this very sensible recommendation, and 
so the legislation that led to the permanent Committee gave the Attorney General the 
responsibility to appoint the lay members without consulting the party leaders.14 The 
failure of the government to adopt a non-partisan or multi-partisan system for 
appointing lay members of the Committee is, from my perspective, the one serious 
flaw in the system.
During the early mandate of the Harris government, the Attorney General was 
distrustful of the JAAC system that had been set up initially by a Liberal 
government, and which by 1995 had lay members who had been appointed by an 
NDP government. For several years, the Attorney General regularly requested 
additional names from the committee until the name of someone he thought had 
more “trial experience”, such as a prosecutor, appeared. From my perspective, this 
period represented an abuse of process that demeaned democratic values.15 This 
abuse of process could have been avoided had the parties agreed to a multi-partisan 
or non-partisan approach to appointing the lay members of the JAAC.
Does the JAAC model comply with the democratic principles outlined above? I 
believe that in most respects it does. First, both social equality and minority rights 
are advanced because the committee makes every effort to recommend the best 
possible applicants for appointment, and encourages members of minority groups 
and women to apply. Second, the committee works hard to make decisions through 
consensus, if possible. Third, the committee does its best to make recommendations 
in an impartial fashion, and its procedures are designed to prevent undue influence 
from any groups or individuals. However, although political ideology is generally 
not a factor that is considered by the committee in its deliberations, the potential for 
political manipulation of the committee through the Attorney General’s power to 
appoint lay members without consultation with other party leaders could mean that 
political ideology might become a central factor in the judicial selection process, as it 
did during the early years of the Harris government and as it often does in some 
jurisdictions in the United States.
T h e  id e o l o g ic a l  a n d  p h il o s o p h ic a l  f a c t o r s
In the United States, the ideology of candidates for judicial appointment is often a 
factor in the appointments process, especially with regard to appointments to the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Given the approach to democracy outlined in this paper, I argue
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that ideology should not be a factor in judicial appointments in an advanced 
democracy.
The majority of Canadian judges, at least at the appellate court level, agree that 
most judges tend to have a somewhat conservative or somewhat liberal disposition in 
relation to specific kinds of issues such as criminal justice, human rights, or 
economic issues.16 I suggest that the philosophical bents that all of us have are partly 
innate—qualities that we are bom with—and partly a result of our life experience 
and socialization. It would be hard to find any individual that we could not describe 
as having a liberal or conservative approach to at least some social issues. I also 
suggest that these philosophical bents are distributed more or less randomly 
throughout the population of lawyers who apply for judgeships. Both the liberal and 
conservative dispositions are valuable in reasoning through difficult issues in the 
judicial decision-making process—in considering all sides of complex issues. It 
would be counterproductive to establish a judicial appointments process that attempts 
to screen out candidates with either a liberal or a conservative disposition. What is 
more important is to try to screen out candidates whose disposition is so strong that 
they could abandon the attempt to be as impartial as possible. When disposition 
hardens into an agenda, there is the danger that impartiality might be compromised. 
That is why judicial appointments processes in advanced democracies should be as 
non-partisan as possible, and open to good candidates with both liberal and 
conservative dispositions.
T h e  f e d e r a l  j u d ic ia l  a p p o in t m e n t s  p r o c e s s
The Ontario JAAC system—with the addition of a multi-partisan or non-partisan 
system for appointing lay members, should be seen as a model for the reform of the 
process for appointment of s. 96 judges as well as s. 101 judges, and the JAAC 
model should also apply to elevations of judges to appellate courts.
With regard to appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada, an ad hoc 
committee along the lines of the Ontario JAAC should be established whenever there 
is a vacancy on the Supreme Court. The composition of the Supreme Court ad hoc 
JAAC would take into account the region of the country from which the appointment 
is to be made. After advertising for candidates to apply for the position, considering 
references, and interviewing the top candidates, the JAAC would submit two or three 
names in confidence to the Minister of Justice and Prime Minister. The Prime 
Minister could ask for additional names from the ad hoc JAAC, but if so would be 
required to explain publicly the reasons for this request, while respecting the privacy 
of the applicants and the confidentiality of the process.
The candidate selected by the Prime Minister would be introduced to an ad hoc 
Committee of the House of Commons, following the example of the interview of 
Justice Rothstein, Prime Minister Harper’s nominee to the Supreme Court. Justice 
Rothstein’s experience of this process, as described in a recent address to U.N.B.’s
Faculty of Law, indicates that due to serendipitous circumstances, the procedure was 
fair and could serve two useful purposes.17 First, this process could prevent Prime 
Ministers from abusing their power to make partisan appointments. And second, this 
process can help to de-mystify the courts and to introduce Canada’s top judges to 
Canadians.
Will we ever get to this stage? It depends on the quality of our political 
leadership in Ottawa. If Ontario implemented a largely satisfactory system two 
decades ago, surely such a reform can take place at the national level. My study of 
ethical politics in Canada has taught me that ethics reforms at the national level 
usually lag behind reforms at the provincial level by one to two decades.18 It seems 
to me that the national ship of state is larger and more cumbersome than its 
provincial counterparts, and it takes simply longer for it to change direction.
17 Justice Rothstein, “Judicial Selection and the Supreme Court of Canada” (Ivan C. Rand Memorial 
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